Planning Theory for the naive?

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Globalisation implies the establishment of a neo-liberal society to match the neo-liberal economy. In this context planning theory seems to be reduced to pure ideology. The question thus follows, is planning theory then essentially useless for all theoretical or practical purposes? Moreover, can planning theory solve the moral dilemmas faced by planning professionals? And what does the communicative turn in planning theory stand for? Who need it: only the naïve? These are just some of the questions raised in the following introductory discussion on planning theory.

The global context

In the historical process of expanding capitalism, trade was organised through single city-states or leagues of cities in partnership, and later through centralised nation states or empires.¹ The preconditions for the free flow of money and assets has traditionally been organised within states and by agreements between states, but this state-based practice is increasingly being superseded by international organisations such as the WTO and others.² The emergence of democracy in single states around the world is often associated with expanding capitalistic conditions in those countries. The process of globalisation indicates that provision is made for productive investments and profits to flow freely all around the world, which implies the dismantling of all barriers to the free flow of such monies and assets. This process of economic globalisation has not, however, been complemented by the development of global democratic institutions, representative of the global community as a whole. In this sense, we seem to live in a world where expanding capitalism is not matched by expanding freedom in terms of a wider territorial coverage of democratic institutions.

The imbalance between global capitalism and national democracy actualises a dilemma: the contradiction between the global and unlimited accumulation of assets on the one hand and the state-based and limited redistribution of assets through taxes on the other. The reallocation of assets is a distinctive feature of all known societies other than those persisting in a subsistence economy climate, because the reproduction of wage labour is impossible to manage solely through market mechanisms. The present day dilemma is that national governments feel compelled to reduce taxes and dismantle reallocation mechanisms for the national reproduction of labour (such as elderly care, health services and education) in order to ‘appealing’ to investors. The national welfare regimes are not, however, compensated for on the global level by any kind of system for the reallocation of assets, as market mechanisms are supposed to generate enough wealth for each and everyone. As that does not necessarily take place, globalisation seems to generate wealth for the few and poverty for the rest.³ Nationally anchored democratic institutions also seem to be
conceived as obstacles to globalisation to the extent that they persist in collecting taxes and reallocating resources.

The deregulation of property markets across Europe during the last quarter of a century or so is an instructive example of the effects of globalisation. The dismantling of barriers to free investing in real estate has been seen as an urgent task by governments in most European countries. This has been accompanied by decentralisation of decision-making and the overhaul of the national planning systems. The changing role of public authorities implies a switch from control to the promotion of development. The direct involvement of elected bodies is being replaced piecemeal by a planning system where ‘stakeholders’ rather than the democratically elected representatives of the population as a whole hold sway. This change is often labelled ‘governance’ in contrast to old-fashioned ‘government’, and it is propagated as an extension and not as a reduction of democracy. In the ideological justification of a liberalised land regime, planning theory stressing the communication aspect (‘bottom-up’) as apart from public control (‘top-down’) has been very influential. Why less public control in matters relating to land use and the appropriation of land rent should be seen as more ‘bottom-up’ than previous land regimes is however rarely elucidated. The role of planning theory seems then to have been reduced to that of pure ideology. What then is the use of planning theory?

**Is planning theory useless?**

Bish Sanyal has questioned the usefulness of planning theory for practitioners: ‘What do planners rely upon when engaged in compromising? What theory of action can they look to for guidance? The current literature on so called planning theory is rather thin and somewhat useless for this purpose.’ Actually his concern does not relate to the relevance of planning theory to planners in general, but to the usefulness of planning theory for practitioners dealing with moral judgements. According to his studies of planning practitioners, when troubled with moral dilemmas and looking for ethical compromises they do not find any planning theories useful. Sanyal concludes that theories of negotiation have very little to say about the moral judgements planners must make. In making this claim, he actually more or less ridicules the whole thrust of mainstream planning thought that has prevailed in recent decades.

The moral dilemmas Sanyal refers to are increasingly encountered in planning practice as an effect of globalisation, which has created a growing set of uncertainties. Compromises are needed and planners get involved, but how can they manage processes, which cannot be directed with a fixed code of conduct appropriate for all times and all places? Unlike globalisation’s apologists or sceptics, the planners have, according to Sanyal, to cope with the factual effects of globalisation and they have to work out compromises concerning time schedules, planning processes and envisaged outcomes. Sanyal thinks that these compromises are of a moral nature: the relative autonomy of planners is highlighted in this context, and they have to make moral judgements within the limits of the possible. Should they, for instance, give in to developers’ demands for tax concessions? Should they accept a reduction in labour standards as an inevitable part of an ‘enterprise zone’, etc.?

What is needed is ‘the art of ethical compromises’. In the context of globalisation, conflicts of interest as well as conflicts of principles emerge. Sanyal thinks it is almost impossible to find compromise if conflicts are defined as ‘conflicts of principles’ as
opposed to ‘conflicts of interests’. Consequently, success in compromise would require the transformation of principles to interests. The planner has to define the issue at hand in such a way that tradeoffs are possible, which in its turn presupposes relevant knowledge. Instead of studying disasters, Sanyal advocates the study of planning successes such as attracting investments without compromising labour or environmental standards. This kind of knowledge could then obviously encourage planners to find ethically acceptable compromises. Planners would then be appreciated for their small successes instead of being maligned for their lack of theory and inconsistency.

**Professionalism and theory**

If planning theory is of little use to practitioners, perhaps it is to some use for others? Yes, says John Friedmann, ‘…it is essential to the vitality and continued relevance of planning as a profession.’8 This view is of course understandable coming from a university professor who earns his living by producing planning theory. But there is more to it than that: there can be no profession without a particular expertise, including formalised training and (preferably) some experience of the trade. Experts are specialists, that is to say, they possess, by definition, knowledge of a kind that laymen lack. The tasks of an expert must be defined in a way that includes moments of action, which demand particular skills acquired during the training. Practical skills can be picked up in professional practice, but professional skills include theoretical knowledge as well as particular ethical attitudes and aesthetic preferences, which form the core of a profession’s training programme. The prestige of any profession seems to depend on the perceived degree of theoretical knowledge associated with that profession. The more ‘specialist’ one is considered to be, the less there is of supply compared to demand, and the more prestige and income is likely to follow.

The professional dilemma of planners resembles that of architects. Sometimes both of these professions find it hard to point to the particular body of theoretical knowledge that would distinguish them from other professions or academic faculties. The ‘theory of planning’ has, as such, emerged by fusing together bits and pieces of social and political science, economics, psychology, geography, art history, aesthetics, etc. It is, however, questionable to what degree ‘planning theory’ forms an autonomous body of thought, which would be distinct from all of these sources of inspiration from other academic faculties. The professional dilemma of architects is an instructive example. After being master builders and experts in a whole range of matters, the profession of architects has been deprived of much of their expertise by other professions. What is left for them is sometimes considered to be the issue of aesthetics, that is, architects are presumed to be experts on architecture (whatever that means).

But can there be ‘experts’ on aesthetical or ethical matters? Yes and no! On the individual level, some are more interested and educated in matters of style and taste, or with regard to ethical issues for that matter, than others. Some seem to be more gifted than others in this respect. But this does not mean that there would be a growing body of thought concerning aesthetics and ethics that would progress in terms of quality over time.9 The difference here with science and mathematics is striking. Ancient works of mathematics may be of historical interest, but they are fairly useless for modern mathematicians. The same cannot be said about aesthetical and ethical matters. Ancient art and writings on ethics have more or less the same topicality now as they had more than two thousand years ago. Skills of an aesthetical
and ethical character can be acquired over an individual lifetime, but when the individual passes away, with her/him goes her/his skills and knowledge. Matters of taste and morals are individual issues in the sense that every human being has to start from scratch. Architects may be experts on prevailing aesthetical preferences among architects (equals architecture), but their conception of beauty is often in opposition to the preferences of ordinary people. In sharp contrast to this, the findings of concurrent mathematicians are beyond the horizon of laymen but affect the lives of everyone.

To conclude, some branches of knowledge, for instance mathematics and technology, can be accumulated while knowledge related to other branches of human life such as ethical and aesthetical matters concern judgement, which is not accumulative in the same sense as mathematics and high-technology are. Possible expertise in ethics and aesthetics (if we oversee the history of these faculties) is an exponent of life experience, not of theoretical insights alone, and therefore it is doubtful to what extent any profession can claim expert knowledge concerning matters of judgement and taste. This does not mean that all communities or cultures are equally bewildered in matters of ethics and aesthetics. I do think that some societies produce more of collective beauty and fairness than others, but this is not an exponent of expert rule, rather the contrary. Beauty and fairness thrive where they are objects of collective and public interest.

Can moral dilemmas be solved by theory?

Could planning theory provide guidelines for practicing planners facing moral dilemmas? I strongly doubt it! Firstly, ‘theory’ in the academic sense of the word would indicate an accumulating body of knowledge. ‘Planning theory’ fit for assisting practitioners in solving moral controversies would imply that experts on morality could solve planning problems of a moral nature in an increasingly sufficient manner. I find this impossible to believe, not because I possess particular liberal values that hold me back from advocating a kind of society where experts rule over all aspects of life, but because matters of an aesthetic and ethical character are simply beyond any kind of expertise. Good or bad, right or wrong, beautiful or ugly, are categories that are often imposed on each of us by others, but might does not make right. If the moral dilemmas of planning could be solved by theory, we would live in a society of perpetually increasing moral standards. If architects really possessed the definition of beauty, we would live in a society of perpetually increasing aesthetical standards. I dare to doubt that this is the case.

Secondly, planners construct plans in response to alleged problems related to a specifically emerging subject matter or to procedural issues. In a similar manner, I assume, planning theoreticians construct theories in response to alleged intrinsic or extrinsic problems related to planning and to previous theories. In both cases the aim is to solve problems. This is utterly different from academia in general, where the point of departure is not to solve problems but to define them. The theoretical work in even such an applied discipline as sociology does not by necessity implicate the construction of a new theory, but rather the identification of shortcomings in prevailing thought: the ability to define a (new) problem is the core of theoretical insight, not the ability to solve it. Of course the distinction between problem solving and problem formulation is to some extent arbitrary. Problem formulation may imply (particular) solutions, and problem solving may generate new (theoretical) problems.
The point here is, however, that professions such as engineers and architects with a background in handicraft, or the rational management of practical matters, stick to a tradition of problem solving while the more theoretical disciplines operate the other way around, defining problems. Moral dilemmas may of course concern problem formulation as well as problem solving. But the more a problem is related to efficiency and thereby instrumental approaches, the less it probably generates second thoughts of a moral nature among practitioners. If planners and planning theoreticians should be blamed for something, it would be for being predominantly instrumental in their approach to professional matters. At its best, planning theory could provide some insights into the dilemmas related to planning commissions as such, not only to the practical work of producing plans in terms of processes and outcome. But this seems to be something very far away from Bish Sanyal’s request for ethically relevant theory as he invoked the success stories and refuted planning disasters.

Planning theory in context
The meaning of planning theory is of course relative to the kind of theory under scrutiny. Much of the output of planning theorists could be characterised as an endless series of classification attempts and the elaboration of typologies of thought. John Friedmann in his response to Bish Sanyal tries to relate the question of benefits to mode of theory by making a classification of planning theory into three categories. Firstly, theories in planning are of an instrumental character and they concern the subject matters of planning such as land-use, transportation, environment, etc. Secondly, theories of planning address what is common to all of them. These theories are generic and normative. Thirdly, theories about planning deal with planning as it is actually practiced in particular contexts. According to Friedmann, categories one and three are unequivocally relevant for planning practice. The dispute concerns type two, which according to Friedmann is relevant as well, because any proposition concerning what planning ought to be is grounded in some set of theoretical assumptions. The theory in terms of particular standards and parameters is always there, consciously or unconsciously, as soon as judgements are made.

The position of Friedmann is discussed by E.R. Alexander who interprets the claim concerning theories of planning to mean that planning practice needs a theory of what planning is or should be. According to Alexander, viewing generic planning theories as ideologies offers the potential for some insight in addressing the issue of their relevance for planning practices. Alexander also refutes the idea of making a difference between the theory of planning and theories about planning. This seems to make sense, because planning ideologies of course embrace not only planning as such, but the societal context as well. The ideal planning system cannot be disconnected from the ideal society, and the way the context of planning is drawn up in each case most probably implies a particular (ideal) view on the functions of planning.

Providing any particular idea of the ideal planning system is always connected to a particular idea of the ideal society, we could then perhaps analyse planning theories in terms of implied worldviews and political ideologies. Now, one could claim that there is a significant body of writing on planning theory that draws its inspiration from a vast array of political bric-a-brac, much of which lacks logical coherence. Therefore there is by no means a necessarily clear correspondence between a particular planning theory and particular traditions of political thought. This seems obvious, because
many of the most celebrated authors of planning theory seem to be dilettantes of political history. In addition, the connection between planning theory and political worldview may not be consciously elaborated or even recognised by the author. Consequently it would be unfair to put political labels on theoreticians in a way that they themselves do not recognise.

I think, however, that it is very important to assess prevailing theoretical concepts in terms of broader ideological trends. Referring to analytical philosophy, we could make a distinction between ratio and causa: ratio refers to the explanations of those involved and causa to cause. Explanations could of course correspond to actual causes or correspondences, but much of the time they do not. Rhetoric demands arguments with a flair for moral integrity, which normally excludes arguments expressing self-interest or outright cheating. Everybody involved wants to keep a clean shield. In order to comment on planning theory – that is, to produce meanings – the outspoken intentions of the author of the theory under scrutiny is, needless to say, interesting, but, with reference to the discipline as a whole, a broader grip on the subject may be of interest. Does it make sense to interpret prevailing planning theories in the context of political developments as a whole? I think so!

The communicative turn
A switch from ontological to epistemological matters, or vice versa, seems to emerge periodically throughout the history of thought. ‘The communicative turn’ could be characterised as such a change of interest from ontological to epistemological matters, embracing social sciences in particular during the post-war period, and with accelerating speed in recent decades. In planning, ‘…its language would be future seeking, but not, like its physical blueprint and goal-directed predecessors, future defining.’ The need for change is in a rhetorically suggestive way built up by degrading planning of the past: ‘…technical and administrative machineries advocated and created to pursue these goals in the past have been based on what we now see as a narrow scientific rationalism.’ These so-called machineries ‘…have further compromised the development of a democratic attitude and have failed to achieve the goals promoted.’ The paradigm shift is here and ‘…the new wave…seeks to escape from the strait-jacket of a narrow instrumental rationality…It searches for ways of going beyond a preoccupation with the distribution on material resources.’

The ‘communicative turn’ has very often been conceived as an enlargement and empowerment of democratic processes. The idea is that public government embedded in representative democracy has failed to deliver social justice and environmental sustainability, and that government has compromised the development of a democratic attitude as well. Patsy Healy has been one of the most influential proponents of the communicative turn in planning, baptising her own version ‘collaborative planning.’ Attacking ‘pricing strategies’ in planning, ‘aesthetic relativism’ and the ‘extending of modernity’s tolerance’ as well as ‘idealist fundamentalism’ implying the application of one single ‘uni-dimensional hegemony’, she speaks in favour of communicative rationality as the only (!) possible alternative. The notion of reason as inter-subjective mutual understanding in a given historical context is propagated, but at the same time the demand for ‘respectful discussion’ is not applied with regard to competing endeavours.
Here, the interest is not to assess whether the communicative turn in planning theory is right or wrong, but rather to inquire why it has gained momentum during the last quarter of a century. Is there a genuine democratic deficit that has to be overhauled or are the reasons for this best sought somewhere else? Concerning the alleged deficit of democracy, notions like ‘democracy’, ‘development’, and ‘sustainability’ are not analytic but synthetic concepts, which are generally accepted as legitimate rhetorical means to pursue whatever one’s aims. Add ‘gender equity’ and you have it all! It cannot however be asserted ‘once and for all’ to what extent planning traditions in general, or even individually, are democratic or not. Each case is different and has to be judged according to factual circumstances. Consequently, communicative planning may advance democratic attitudes or it may not. Actually collaborative planning as sketched by Healey in a number of writings seems to me to imply a whole array of manipulative elements, which would seem to sit uneasily with democracy in terms of deliberation and prudence.20

There may however be other reasons for the prevalence of communicative planning theory? I think one such reason could be found in the prevalence of neo-liberal ideology, and in particular in the need to establish social institutions consistent with the neo-liberal society, that is to say, institutions that match and advance the free flow of investments and development. A new planning regime with a minimum of predefined restrictions and guidelines and ample possibilities for striking deals on the local level is in conformity with the neo-liberal ideals. Two basic concepts – ‘public interest’ and ‘political community’ – are of particular interest when commenting on the political implications of communicative planning approaches. The degrading of something traditionally labelled public interest and the reduction of citizens to stakeholders through the introduction of the concept of political community or other labels may shed some light on the concurrent development of communicative planning theory.

The notion of public interest

According to Stefano Moroni it is commonplace today in the planning field to say that ‘the public interest does not exist’.21 Moroni has discussed various arguments counter to the idea of public interest, and concludes that it is not possible for planners to do without some notion of the public interest.22 He thus asserts that the rethinking of the concept is more important than its abandonment.

A major critiquing argument against the idea of public interest is that it cannot be the interest of all, given the diversity of interests among individuals. There would consequently be no planning in the interest of all and the planner is in any case not alone in being unable to understand and formulate the public interest. In this kind of reasoning, public interest is conceived of in a distributive sense. One could argue, however, that the public interest is not the real interest of each individual but the potential interest of anyone, that is, the public interest is a collective interest regarding an indefinite number of non-assignable individuals.

From a theoretical point of departure, the public interest could be seen as corresponding to the production of ‘public goods’, which is an established concept in economics, determining those goods that cannot be supplied by market mechanisms. Public goods are non-excludable (nobody can be excluded from consuming them), non-rival (the consumption by one individual does not deprive other individuals of the
possibilities of consumption) and sometimes non-rejectable (one must consume them), and therefore nearly impossible to turn into market commodities. Consequently, it seems to be a ‘fact’ that such goods exist, but it is of course disputed to what extent they should be considered a public interest to produce: consider for instance the beauty of the landscape.

In line with the traditional utilitarian view, there is a public interest in safeguarding the ability of individuals to maximise their individual interests, which would produce the maximum outcome of benefits for society as a whole. The ideal that the sum of individual optimums would lead to a total optimal is of course disputed, but even the crudest utilitarianism recognises a public interest. Society must also provide for the supply of some other essential public goods as well (security, law and order, etc.), and the acceptance of this idea means the acceptance of the existence of something called a public interest.

According to the communicative approach to planning, the notion of public interest is cast in doubt and the theory is professed as being contrary to the idea of public interest.23 Public interest is recognised primarily as the interests of the major businesses and promoted by the representative model of democracy. Involving the public in articulating the public interest would challenge the politician’s responsibility for the task and the role of the representatives.24 Accordingly, public interest is associated with the traditional planning regime and its connections to stakeholder groups and corresponding political lobbies.25

To refute the existence of public interest as a fact, or to deny it as something that can be formulated within the context of representative democracy, seems to me to represent a view of total alienation to concurrent achievements. National, regional and local planning regimes are tied up by international charters, which for instance concern environmental issues and cultural heritage. ‘Sustainable development’ is considered to be an overriding value, which has infiltrated almost every policy document of the EU and other international institutions. Perhaps ‘sustainable development’ is not a factual interest in line with the perceptions of each and every individual, but it is certainly a collective interest because of its elevated position in any environmental discussion. To claim the non-existence of public interest with the argument that it does not exist as a fact, or that there exists no extra-individual or overriding values, it then to deny the factual implications of ideas approved by democratically elected bodies, and it is to refute the importance of substantial international agreements (elaborated in a communicative process!).

**Stakeholders ‘R’ (not) Us**

In the context of globalisation, national and regional as well as local planning regimes have to compete for investments and development. Territorially organised democratic governments may hamper the free flow of investments where politicians find (for instance environmental, social and political) costs to be too high compared to the foreseen benefits. For the local population, short-term interests (such as employment) may be contrasted against overriding principles of an ordered society and peaceful co-operation among its residents. In many cases, farsighted voters may prefer to consider principles ahead of interests, which is probably a clever long-term strategy from their point of view.
Within the neo-liberal conception, compromises and adjustments are more likely to occur through the adjustment of interests than by getting involved in tampering with principles. Promoting the idea of ‘stakeholders’ instead of ‘citizens’ or ‘everybody’ is a way of playing down the question of principles and public interest while upgrading the question of particular interests. If the public interest could be conceived of as the collective interest of all, then the question emerges how this collective interest could be formulated beyond that of individual interests, or as something other than the sum of individual interests. To refer to ‘stakeholders’ does not do, because not all of those in need of public goods are stakeholders in terms of partners in any particular development project. The factual _externalities_ of any investment affect as a rule many more people than the ‘stakeholders’ usually involved.

Providing that we accept the notion of a _public interest_, how could it be formulated and by whom? A trivial answer to the question is that it is formulated within the system of representative democracy, supplemented by various forms of direct decision-making (referendums, etc.) when needed. The notion that many politicians are corrupt, or that representative democracy is intimately linked to huge institutional interest and lobbies may be correct, but the solution is in my view not to deny the democratic potential of that government, but to analyse its shortcomings and to suggest improvements. People are killed in all countries, but this is not a sufficient reason to make killing legal. It is pure nonsense to advocate ‘governance’ (as alleged ‘bottom-up’ involvement) as superior to ‘government’ (as alleged ‘top-down’ procedures) as if democratic ideals and fairness could be implemented by organisational reforms only. Much more is demanded for that, and we cannot close our eyes to the fact that the elites are the architects of governance structures, never the crowd. Fairness for all may emerge when the huge majority of the lower parts of the social ladder are strong enough to establish their interpretations of fairness, providing the elite does not corrupt their ideas, but this seems very unlikely to occur.

According to the collaborative theory of planning, the concept of ‘political community’ is introduced as an alternative to representative democracy and old-fashioned government. The definition of ‘political community’ is extremely wide, enabling almost any group of stakeholders to be called a political community. This opens the way for arbitrariness as to stakeholders and the ‘design’ of a manipulative play where the actors may be totally ignorant of their factual functions in the play. Planning theory for the naïve? Yes, the idea of ‘political community’ must be understood in the context of the refutation of ‘public interest’, and the involvement of particular interests represented by groups that can strike deals when needed. The play would be played in a way where most actors are pure ‘extras’. Supernumeraries have little to contribute when deals are struck between leading parties, financiers and developers.

**Concluding remarks**

When academic ideas are traded on the intellectual marketplace, they are subjected to the laws of rhetoric as are all other kinds of discourses. We all want to promote democracy, development, sustainability and equity. In the name of democracy we oppose all other ideas than our own. In the name of development and sustainability we do the same. However, in order not to be fooled by the outspoken pretensions of others, it may be better to stick to factual analyses of ideas and discourses rather than taking outspoken pretensions for granted. Personally, I do prefer communicative acts
to more brutal alternatives like blunt violence in the way people seek to solve their disputes, but this does not mean that peaceful communication is totally innocent. Every storyline is part of a context, and it is the story that gives the storyline a meaning in the end.

To me, it seems fairly futile to promote democracy by trying to establish institutions for the few rather then for the many. Concurrent democratic institutions across Europe certainly fail legitimacy and efficiency tests in delivering public goods according to prevailing needs and demands. But this does not mean that newly installed institutions would do a better job. As such, it is more important to formulate the problem in respect of the present dysfunctions of the political system than to start designing new institutions. One reason for the crises of representative democracy could be that traditional parties are organised in accordance with the position of their supporters with regard to production tasks: merchants, clerks, farmers, workers. Perhaps this no longer has any organisational relevance? Perhaps then it is the party system that is in crises, not representative democracy as such? Perhaps we can even see a party system evolving that is based on the position of their supporters with regard to consumption and life-styles: the greens, heritage, sports, etc.?

The idea that university people who train planners should be engaged in the design of a new society – at the same time as they absolutely reject the idea of any kind of blueprint design for any other dimension of life – is slightly absurd. As Aristotle put it when delivering a broadside against (allegedly the first) planning theoretician known to history, that is, Hippodamus: ‘He wished to be considered expert in the whole range of natural sciences too; and he was the first person not actually taking part in the working of a constitution to attempt some description of the ideal one.’

Theoreticians of planning have persuasive idols in the history of planning, but planning academia would probably thrive better in an air of less political opportunism and more scientific rationalism.

1 By capitalism is meant ‘a social and economic system in which individuals are free to own the means of production and maximize profits and in which resource allocation is determined by the price system’. Bannock, Baxter & Davis 1998, p. 52.
2 The relative independence of international bodies regulating global capitalism from single states or joint ventures of states is of course a disputed issue.
3 Chossudovsky 1999.
4 Healey 1997b.
5 Sanyal 2002, p. 120.
6 With regard to the Habermasian approach, Sanyal refers (footnote 11) to Healy 1997a.
7 ibid.
8 Friedmann 2003, p. 9.
9 Already in the latter part of the 17th century in France, the question of progress in society was discussed intensively, and the conclusion of this discussion was – rightly so I think – that matters of an ethical and aesthetical nature cannot ‘progress’ in the same sense that technical innovation or economic accumulation do.
10 An empirical study shows that students of architecture are socialised through their studies into aesthetic preferences that are opposed to those of the majority in society.
11 This insight was already realised in France during the latter part of the 17th century as a result of an extensive discussion on the issue of progress in the French Academy. See Lowenthal 1995, p. 74-124.
14 Healey 1997a, p. 252.
15 Healey 1997a, p. 234.
16 Healey 1997a, p. 234.
....to engage in any other strategy is to generate once again forms of planning that have inherent within them an antidemocratic dominatory potential.’ Healey 1997b, p. 252.

One example of the manipulative potential: ‘A powerful discourse, energetically diffused, has the capacity to change what people think and what they do, and to maintain these changes.’ See Healey 2003a, p. 251. Here persuasion is made totally instrumental, void of any moral stand.

References


