The Southern railway station in Kaliningrad - the way to Russia. Photo: Denis Sechkin
Yes, it's true – Kaliningrad possesses 90% of the world's amber stock. This could be a powerful argument if we were speaking about uranium or hydrocarbons but amber necklaces, sadly, are not a key commodity in the global economy.
Yes, it's true – Kaliningrad is a Russian ice-free port. But the cargo from mainland Russia to/from the Kaliningrad Region is shipped by railway in transit through Belarus and Lithuania.
Yes – Kaliningrad is a "gateway to Russia". But "the gates" are too far away from "core Russia". As such, the extension of interaction is possible only through the promotion of special non-market incentives.
Yes, it's true – Kaliningrad is a Special Economic Zone (SEZ). But SEZs already represent a serious departure from market mechanisms compensating for the reality of the geographical remoteness of the Kaliningrad Region (from the core of Russia). Customs and tax privileges relating to the Kaliningrad Region reached 42% of Kaliningrad's GRP.
Yes, it's true - Kaliningrad is used to being called a "Russian exclave in the centre of Europe".
But "the centre" itself is the real problem. The neighbours of the Kaliningrad region themselves do not enjoy a particularly high level of development. The weak situation of Kaliningrad is additionally compounded by the fact that it borders on the least developed regions of Poland and Lithuania. The local neighbourhood as such which Kaliningrad finds itself in does not really stimulate development.
Another pervasive myth is that the problems of the regions were initiated by the collapse of the USSR. The reality is they emerged precisely at the end of the Soviet period. Currently the region still fundamentally depends on imported raw materials and foodstuffs. In addition the exporting capacities of the region around Kaliningrad remain limited.
The main domestic myth is the assured belief of the majority of the people of Kaliningrad in the distinctive peculiarity of their region. Are there any reasons for this? The short answer is yes.
It is the only Russian overseas territory. After the collapse of the USSR its residents were forced to switch from their traditional job to scratching a living from taking trips across the border to neighbouring Poland several times per day to sell tiny lots of goods. Some of the luckiest ones are now the owners of retail chains.
Having "prosperous Europe" to their west and Moscow to the east both of whom, at the beginning of the 1990s, lacked an adequate understanding of Kaliningrad's self-styled uniqueness saw the residents of the region frighten the metropolis in terms of the ghost of "separatism".
The ghosts of revanchism and treason still, moreover, loom large for some Kaliningrad residents. "Isolationists", as such, try to counter any attempts to make an "open house" of the region.
Tourism was not a priority, to put it politely, due to the special nature of the post- cold war regime which limited the entrance of foreigners to the region. A short tourist season encompassing several run down and old fashioned resort towns is all that the Amber Region could deliver. In 2000, 323,300 tourists (264,200 persons from Russia and 59,100 foreign tourists) visited the region.
In the seven years up to 2007 this figure increased slightly to 396,700 (308,500 Russians/88,200 'others'). But by means of comparison an annual sailing race in the city of Kiel, with some 230,000 inhabitants, hosts up to 3 million guests each year!
It is estimated that around 450,000 tourists visited Kaliningrad in 2008. Further development comes through comparison -the Lithuanian resort town of Palanga, with only 17,000 inhabitants however annually hosts approximately one million foreign tourists.
Recently much has been said about the development of water tourism and yachting. Sure enough the inter-mediate point on the sea voyage from Gdansk to Klaipeda is Kaliningrad but there is one big problem: the existing ban on foreigners sailing in inland waters. This problem is not within the competence of the local authorities to solve being a Federal responsibility.
That is why it is a slow and complicated process to argue for change. Despite the recent optimistic statements coming out of Kaliningrad the area will not become the tourist Mecca of the Baltic Sea Region any time soon. It has another role to play, namely, as a place for negotiations to be held.
The most telling example of coopera-tion is probably joint effort aimed at the protection of the ecological balance of the Baltic Sea. Pollutants dumped into the sea impregnate the sediments and are constantly disturbed contaminating other parts of the Baltic.
This fact alone necessitates that states undertake much closer collaboration in this area. No country alone can force through a decision in this area. In dealing with issues of the 'global commons', like those relating to environmental protection of the seas, cooperation is fundamental. This is why the best practice examples of ecological cooperation are primarily of importance as "schools of dialogue".
The Baltic Sea Region today is one of the most important contact points in the unification of Europe. Despite the existence of the Suez Canal and other Southern routes connecting Europe with Asia, transit through the BSR is both shorter and more secure. But perhaps the most important issue here is that it runs through Russia.
The introduction of a simplified transit regime, which remains a much coveted future goal of Russia-EU relations, will make business and personal contacts between the Kaliningrad Region and the rest of Europe easier, but will also facilitate the tackling of the problem of upgrading transit links to the core territory of Russia itself.
The benefits for Kaliningrad's residents are obvious: intensification of contacts, boosting tourism, creating a more attractive investment climate. From the point of view of Russia, such a move could simulate the creation of a (future) general visa-free regime between Russian and Europe.
What then should Kaliningrad's inhabitants do to promote the drive towards a new higher round of collaboration with those parts of Europe surrounding it?
First of all, get rid of their lasting phobias and myths in respect of their neighbours, as well as their own illusions and those of 'mother Russia'. Russia simply will not facilitate Kaliningrad 'uniqueness' or allow 'separatism' to flourish.
The most important point is however to ensure that Kaliningrad plays a fundamental role in all Russia-Europe negotiations, and that it should not be afraid to remind the Federal Centre in Moscow of its continuing existence – and thus its utility.
Otherwise it will remain doubly disadvantaged by its peripheral position as regards both 'core Russia' and the core economic areas of the European states neighbouring it.
Europeans should also divest them-selves of superfluous illusions: namely that the Kaliningrad enclave is somehow not Russia. Kaliningrad's particular interests and problems should to be taken into consideration, but serious negotiations can only be carried out with the Federal centre.
At the same time one cannot be contemptuous of the region's worth to Russia. If an attempt is made to "seduce" it Europe should be under no illusions that they would be forced then to deal with the full might of Russia.
By Denis Sechkin, Journalist, Kaliningrad